What we've been reading (about Iraq, of course)

In the last few days, a number of other interesting pieces have been published and reported about the conflict(s) in Iraq... without great additional comment, here are a few that we find significant:

"A Call to Bring All Troops Home" by Tom Hayden...

... which is really just a distillation of the CAP "Strategic Reset" from a leftist viewpoint (because, for example, Lawrence Korb is definitely not a left winger...).

"Saving Iraq" by Robert Dreyfuss...

... which coherently suggests that we should "simply" enable the anti-occupation nationalist forces in Iraq to coalesce around a polite but firm 'request' that the Multinational Force leave.

"Legitimacy, Toujours Legitimacy" by William Lind...

... and while about the Hamas/Fatah split, it corroborates the view of Dreyfuss for Iraq.

"Understanding Current Operations in Iraq" by David Kilcullen...

... honest, sober, determined, but realistic (in other words, hopeful yet inherently uncertain... and the "honest" part is frankly a presumption offered magnanimously to those with their lives on the line whether they still believe in "the mission" or not).

Aside in closing: we haven't really launched this blog yet but are discouraged by an atmosphere that increasing accepts "waiting until 2009"... Speaker Pelosi may bring Iraq into the defense appropriations process and Senator Webb is returning troop rotations into the calculus of sustainability, but the general sense seems to be that nothing can be done with Messieurs Bush and Cheney in unmitigated control of the military and diplomatic processes...

... and all one needs to do to measure the notion that "Iraq" is passé in the mentality of our political elites is to inspect the program for the Aspen Institute seminars that begin on Monday and you'll see that "Iraq" appears just once, with a panel discussion between Lee Hamilton and General Jack Keane that is moderated by Andrea Mitchell...

... I wonder if Colin Powell & Co. can keep their fingers and toes crossed for eighteen months?

A "Strategic Reset"?

There is a lot to be said for this vision, but so much of it presumes a flexible Bush administration and a susceptible community of international partners that we continue to feel it is putting the cart before the horse if the fundamental legitimacy of any constructive path can be laid that would incorporate the three necessary elements implied below

• the withdrawal of U.S. military and political influences from the center of the Iraqi political conflict...
• the isolation and marginalization of the most incorrigible and violent participants in the conflict...
• the constructive involvement of regional actors as well as a more diverse set of global powers and institutions

Just as the Iraq Study Group proposals would have been a huge step forward if embraced wholeheartedly at the time of their promulgation, this proposal is valuable but misses the point: the timing is such that another meaningless renewal of the current UN Mandate, whatever cosmetic changes it might contain, would simply undermine the legitimacy of any international involvement in the future of the Iraqi tragedy while doing nothing to propose a concrete exit strategy for either the U.S., its allies, or even for its adversaries who will still be there long after the U.S. has left.

We simply wish to suggest that the urgent search for a truly different international mandate for Iraq would be a catalyst toward a more positive set of options...

The Authors of A Call for a New International Mandate for Iraq

from the Center for American Progress: "Strategic Reset: Our New Plan"

• Accept the Reality of Iraq's Political Fragmentation
• Immediately phase out the unconditional arming, equipping, and training of Iraq’s security forces.
• Shift reconstruction, governance, and security assistance to provinces where practical and possible.
• Implement a Phased Military Redeployment from Iraq within One Year
• Extract U.S. troops from Iraq’s civil wars before the end of 2008.
• Make counterterrorism our country’s No. 1 priority.
• Redeploy U.S. troops to neighboring countries and temporarily station 8,000 to 10,000 soldiers in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq until 2009 to prevent a cross-border conflict involving our key ally Turkey, and to protect the region from an expansion of intra-Iraqi violence
• Initiate Regional Security and Diplomatic Efforts to Contain Iraq’s Conflicts
• Promote collective security efforts with active working groups on counterterrorism, refugees, and security confidence-building measures.
• Use the forthcoming review of the United Nations mandate for Iraq to secure formal commitments from other countries to help Iraq as the United States redeploys from Iraq.
• Develop a Strategy to Resolve the Arab-Israeli Confl ict and Stabilize the Middle East
• Appoint a special Middle East envoy with support from two senior ambassadors who would work on two key tracks—containing and managing Iraq’s multiple conflicts and resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.
• Work with partners in the Middle East Quartet as well as regional organizations such as the Arab League to manage and resolve conflicts in the region.

Action Agenda for Strategic Reset in the Middle East in 2007–2008

1. Call for a redeployment of U.S. troops and closure of U.S. military bases in Iraq by the end of 2008. Congress should use the 2008 Defense Authorization and Appropriations bills to call for an immediate redeployment of U.S. troops.
2. Advocate for measures to enhance U.S. military readiness. The current Bush Iraq strategy has led to historic problems with personnel and equipment in the U.S. Army, Marines, and National Guard. Congress should include measures to re-equip our armed forces and support U.S. military personnel and veterans in the Defense Authorization and Appropriations bills.
3. Cut off unconditional U.S. support for Iraq’s national security forces. Congress should stop training Iraqi national forces and seek enforcement of the Leahy Amendment (see page 20 for details on the amendment).
4. Increase the number of Iraqis allowed in the United States annually from 7,000 to 100,000. The United States has a moral obligation to help Iraqis displaced by the conflict, particularly those who risked their lives working with the U.S. military and diplomatic personnel. The Bush administration should raise the limit immediately and implement measures to more efficiently respond to requests for asylum.
5. Downsize the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and diversify U.S. presence around Iraq. Congress should use legislation to make the U.S. embassy smaller without diminishing security for diplomatic personnel.
6. Put pressure on other countries to provide increased economic and humanitarian assistance to Iraqis. Congress should ask for a full review of the total development and humanitarian assistance needs of Iraq from the Bush administration, a complete accounting of assistance pledged by other countries, and a plan to help Iraq garner support for economic reconstruction.
7. Create a new special envoy for Middle East diplomacy. Congress should require the president to appoint a seasoned high-level envoy who can command attention in the region and the resources the State Department and other agencies may need to contain and manage Iraq’s conflicts and resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. This senior diplomat should provide Congress with quarterly reports outlining steps toward stabilizing the region and resolving its conflicts.
8. Provide additional funding and support for collective security efforts in the Middle East and Gulf region. The United States should support cooperative security measures as it resets its military presence in the Gulf region with confidence-building measures such as enhanced border security and increased communications and early warning systems to prevent conflicts.
9. Advocate for a new U.N. mandate for Iraq. The United States should lead an international dialogue on the mandate to restructure international support for Iraq when the current U.N. mandate authorizing the U.S.-led coalition expires at the end of 2007.
10. Prevent continued waste, fraud, and corruption in Iraq. Congress should continue to exercise increased oversight of the billions of dollars lost in Iraq reconstruction projects. Working with the World Bank and other international organizations, the United States should set good governance standards for Iraq’s provincial, local, and national governing authorities.

First Post: The Premise...

This is the first post in this blog meant to accompany the concrete proposal for a radically new international mandate regarding Iraq that would replace the U.N. mandate that expires on December 31, 2007.

First and foremost, the authors of this proposition, and this accompanying commentary, claim no special knowledge or insight into the current situation or its origins and future; on the contrary, we simply feel the debate has become irreparably stagnant because of the violent internal standoff of multiple communities in Iraq, a pair of hardening perspectives in the United States that are fixed by the political calendar, and a world that is observing passively at best or manipulating the conflict at its periphery at worst...

... and we fundamentally abhor the notion that this is an acceptable status quo until 2009, if only for the sake of our fellow citizens serving in uniform and from other departments of government who are valiantly trying to finish a mission that was misbegotten from the outset.

To the degree we diverge from the obvious and accepted facts, here is our premise:

1. We now all realize that the regime of Saddam Hussein was a horrible but stabilizing force in Iraq... and that the oppressed Iraqi people - Shia, Sunni, Kurd, or Christian... devout or secular, moderate and radical alike - were bound to resist and overthrow if the sanctions and containment collapsed...

2. The manner in which the United States led the intervention in Iraq in 2003 undermined much of the legitimacy in what otherwise might have been a necessary as well as just cause...

3. The continued centrality of U.S. influence in the military and political conduct of the current conflict, and the pivotal role of that reality in domestic American politics in 2008, are the critical external factors that are making any progress impossible...

Some readers may disagree with one or more of these thoughts and we invite debate; however, the central question - whether we like it or not - points toward the future. We posed the proposition with a set of questions for comment because we want to try to identify the points of friction that render difficult any change in the current dynamic and we will share those results, as well as reflect any specific and coherent ideas or criticism that we did not anticipate. There are many specific points that we are sure will be raised - "What about the Iraq Study Group?", "the UN is incapable of solving problems...", "the US must protect its credibility of its commitments...", etc. - and we feel we can respond to these and other reactions but do not want to muddy the argument with a long and detailed proactive defense...

... and we are sufficiently realistic and clearheaded to know that there is no ideal or universally acceptable alternative, but we cannot sit idly by while others watch the hands move on the political clocks of expediency and procrastination. We are frankly surprised that the already established deadlines connected with the legitimacy conferred by the series of UN resolutions related to the current situation in Iraq have been ignored as concrete landmarks for reconsideration of the endeavor by all the parties...

We invite the readers of the Call for a New International Mandate Regarding Iraq to take that courageous leap of collective imagination now...